ZONINC--MUNICIPAL No GROWTH LIMITATIONS HELD VIOLATIVE
OF THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL--Construction Industry Association of

Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal.
1974).
In 1972, the City of Petaluma, located in the San Francisco
metropolitan region, undertook measures to control its population
growth by enacting an intricate growth control plan.t Inspired by
' 2 of
local sentiment to preserve the "small town character
Petaluma, the plan embodied several restrictions,' the primary one
being an annual limitation of "new housing units to approximately
4
one-third to one-half of the demographic and market demand.
Such housing restrictions were part of an overall scheme to limit
the city's population to a predetermined figure.5 Although the
growth and development limitations were purported to span only a
five year period, it became evident that the city was seeking to
perpetuate the plan until at least 1990.6
To challenge the validity of the "Petaluma Plan" and to enjoin
its enforcement, the Construction Industry Association of Sonoma
County initiated suit in federal district court against the members
of the Petaluma City Council.7 The crux of the plaintiffs' argument
was that the city had usurped an individual's right to select the
place in which to live, in derogation of his right to travel.' The City
I Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 575-76 (N.D. Cal.
1974). Petaluma, a substantially undeveloped bedroom community, is considered a growth
center for the San Francisco region. The proper growth and development of a region is
largely dependent on the growth center's willingness to accommodate an expanding population. Id. at 579. See also Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super.
11, 20-21, 283 A.2d 353, 358 (L. Div. 197 1), cert. granted, 62 N.J. 185, 299 A.2d 720 (1972),
on remand, 128 N.J. Super. 438, 320 A.2d 223 (L. Div. 1974) (municipality must consider
regional needs in local zoning).
2 Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 576 (N.D. Cal.
1974).
3 id.
4 Id.
5 Id. In 1962, the city prepared a report projecting an estimated population of 77,000
by 1985. However, under the Petaluma Plan, the city arbitrarily restricted its maximum
growth to 55,000 residents by that year. Id.
6 Id. at 577. Steps taken to limit the population through 1990 "include[d] the annual
500 unit building limitation, the urban extension line, and the limitation of available
facilities," such as sewer and water. Id.
Id. at 575-76. The Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County represented
developers who sought to build in Petaluma. Brief for Plaintiff in Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss at 13, Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal.
1974).
8 Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 581 (N.D. Cal.
1974). The court allowed the plaintiffs to raise the rights of the potential purchasers of
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Council, however, defended the plan as a justifiable exercise of its
power to protect the city from uncontrolled growth. 9 In Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma,1 0 the
court held that a "municipality capable of supporting a natural
population expansion" may not restrict growth merely "because it
does not prefer to grow at the rate which would be dictated by
prevailing market demand."'" To do so, the court maintained,
would be to violate an individual's right to travel. 12 To implement
its decision, the court issued a permanent injunction, enjoining the
city from enforcing any ordinances which would directly or indirectly limit the number of people permitted to establish residency
within the city. t" The City of Petaluma, however, has appealed this
14
decision to the Ninth Circuit court of appeals.
Prior to the emergence of the right to travel concept as a viable
means of attacking the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance,
legal challenges were predicated on a substantive due process or
equal protection argument. However, both of these approaches
housing, but indicated that for standing purposes, it was unnecessary to offer any evidence
concerning an individual who had been "actually excluded by the plan." Id.
For a discussion of standing in zoning litigation see Comment, Exclusionary Use of
Planned Unit Development: Standardsfor Judicial Scrutiny, 8 HARV. Civ. RiGH-s-CiV. LIB. L.
REV. 384, 401 & n.108 (1973); Comment, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Local Zoning
Decisions: Restricted Access to State Courts and The Alternative FederalForum, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV.
598, 598 (1971); Note, Extending Standing to Nonresidents-A Response to the Exclusionary Effects
of Zoning Fragmentation, 24 VAND. L. REV. 341, 354-59 (1971).
9 Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 583 (N.D. Cal.
1974). Municipalities derive their zoning and planning power from state enabling legislation
based on the state's police power. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAw OF ZONING § 3.09, at 138
(1968); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R.
Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 199 (1968); Bigham & Bostick, Exclusionary Zoning
Practices: An Examination of the Current Controversy, 25 VAND. L. REv. 1111, 1116 (1972).
Petaluma derived its zoning powers from CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65800 et seq. (West 1966).
Zoning enabling statutes generally require zoning to be in accordance with a comprehensive
plan. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra § 5.02, at 230. See, e.g., CAL. GOVT CODE § 65300 et seq. (West
1966).
A comprehensive plan implies a rational general scheme taking into consideration
social, economic and physical factors in order to develop a coordinated growth plan. See, e.g.,
Kozesnik v. Montgomery Township, 24 N.J. 154, 166-67, 131 A.2d 1, 7-8 (1957); Udell v.
Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 469-70, 235 N.E.2d 897, 900-01, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 893-94 (1968);
Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1155 (1955).
10 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
' Id. at 583.
2 Id. at 581.
13 Id. at 588. The court also retained jurisdiction over the subject matter to insure
compliance with its ruling. Id. at 586-87 & n.4. Justice Douglas has stayed the implementation of the court's ruling, pending the outcome of the subsequent appeal. Order No.
A-1298, entered Sept. 18, 1974, on file at Seton Hall Law Review.
" Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974),
appeal docketed, No. 74-2100 (9th Cir., June 12, 1974).
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have presented problems when utilized in zoning litigation. A
plaintiff employing the substantive due process approach, 5 must
show that an ordinance is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare. 1 6 In satisfying this burden of proof, parties
have had to rebut the traditional presumption of validity accorded
to zoning legislation by the courts.' 7 Even when a debatable argument existed as to the means employed by the municipality, courts
have evinced a willingness to sustain such legislation. This judicial
deference to local enactments has been a major factor in limiting
the success of due process challenges to zoning legislation.18 However, a new judicial attitude with respect to zoning ordinances is
emerging as the need for housing becomes acute. The traditional
15 The substantive due process approach entails an inquiry into whether the legislation
is "a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State," or whether
it is "an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
In the federal courts, a shift in emphasis has occurred in regard to this approach. In
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), the Supreme Court rejected the use of substantive
due process on the federal level by refusing to substitute its own social or economic beliefs
for the judgment of the legislature. Id. at 730-32.
11 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). In upholding the
constitutionality of a comprehensive municipal zoning plan, the Court in Euclid established
that zoning ftr the public welfare does not result in an unconstitutional taking of property.
Id. at 395. For a thorough discussion of the concept of taking of property see F. BOSSELMAN,
D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973). Two years after Euclid, the Court gave the
impression of taking an activist role in zoning litigation when, in Nectow v. Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183 (1928), it invalidated the township's zoning ordinance as not being in furtherance
of the general public health or welfare. Id. at 188-89. However, since this decision, the
Supreme Court has offered little guidance as to the limitations on municipal power to zone
and plan. But see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upheld zoning
ordinance which defined a family unit).
State courts still recognize and employ the substantive due process approach articulated
in Euclid as the proper standard of review when adjudicating land use and zoning problems.
See, e.g., Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251, 281 A.2d 513, 518
(1971); J.D. Constr. Corp. v. Board of Adjustment, 119 N.J. Super. 140, 145, 290 A.2d 452,
455 (L. Div. 1972).
11 Cases illustrative of this judicial policy are: Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972) (rezoning from 35,000 sq. ft. lots to 3 and 6 acre minimum
lots upheld); County Comm'rs v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967) (5 acre zoning
upheld); Fischer'v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952) (5 acre zoning
upheld); Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown Township, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958) (1 acre
zoning valid). See Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Rights of the Whole
World?, 1 FLA. S.U.L. REv. 234, 249 (1973); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning,
Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 784 (1969); Note, ExclusionaryZoning
and Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1645, 1648 (1971). See generally Note, The Irrebuttable
Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1534 (1974).
18 See Comment, Exclusionary Use of the Planned Unit Development: Standardsfor Judicial
Scrutiny, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHws-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 384, 401-03 (1973).
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presumption of validity is being supplanted by a closer scrutiny
which focuses on the methods and motives of zoning legislation. t9
Like the substantive due process challenge, the traditional
equal protection approach 20 has not proven an effective tool in
combatting exclusionary zoning. The traditional equal protection
standard, which invokes minimal scrutiny by the courts, requires
only that a classification bear a rational relationship to a valid state
objective.2 1 The difficulty of successfully showing that no rational
relationship or valid state objective exists is compounded by the
deference given by the courts to classifications established by social
and economic legislation.
Only when legislative classifications affect suspect classifications"

or infringe upon fundamental rights 2 3 is the potent

" See, e.g., Kavanewsky v. Zoning Bd., 160 Conn. 397, 279 A.2d 567 (1971) (1 to 2 acre
zoning invalid); Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W.2d 816 (1962)
(minimum lot size invalid); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J.
Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (L. Div. 1971), cert. granted, 62 N.J. 185, 299 A.2d 720 (1972), on
remaid, 128 N.J. Super. 438, 320 A.2d 223 (L. Div. 1974) (1 and 2 acre minimum lot zoning
invalid); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970) (2 and 3 acre
minimum lots invalid); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (ordinance with
no provision for apartments invalid); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215
A.2d 597 (1965) (4 acre zoning invalid); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va.
653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959) (2 acre zoning invalid).
Numerous writers have advocated that the presumption of validity accorded to exclusionary zoning legislation be abandoned by the courts. See, e.g., Sager, supra note 17, at
784-85; Comment, supra note 8, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REV. at 403 n.122;
Comment, The General Public Interest v. the Presumption of Zoning Ordiance Validity: A Debatable
Question, 50 J. URB. L. 129, 131, 138-39 (1972).
20 For comprehensive discussions of equal protection see Gunther, The Supreme Court,
1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1067 (1969); Note, supra note 17, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1645.
21 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gai Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). The Court enunciated
the test that has become the basis of the traditional equal protection approach by stating
that: (1) legislation will be voided only when it is without any reasonable basis and purely
arbitrary; (2) as long as the classification has a reasonable basis it will be upheld; (3) if any
facts reasonably exist to sustain the classification, the existence of such facts will be assumed
by the court; and (4) the burden of proof is on the person challenging the ordinance to show
such legislation is arbitrary. Id. at 78-79. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86
(1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
22 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
196 (1964). In zoning litigation, courts have applied the strict scrutiny analysis only when the
challenged legislation has affected the suspect classification of race. See, e.g., Kennedy Park
Homes Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1010 (1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970). See also Branfman,
Cohen & Trubek, Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use Controls and the Residential Patterns of
the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483 (1973).
23 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960). Thus far, the Supreme Court
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strict scrutiny analysis triggered. Once this standard is activated, a
state must demonstrate a compelling interest in justification of the
classification,24 an almost impossible feat.2 5 Two major obstacles
arise in attempting to apply this strict scrutiny standard to municipal legislation infringing upon the access to housing. First, the
Supreme Court has refused to acknowledge housing as a fundamental right, although it has recognized the importance of a place
to live.2 6 Second, courts have demonstrated an unwillingness to
declare categories based on wealth suspect classifications.2 7 Consehas recognized several protected fundamental rights. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (right to travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667
(1966) (right to vote); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (indigent's right to a
transcript for purposes of a criminal appeal).
24 As stated in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969):
[A]ny classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that [fundamental] right,
unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is
unconstitutional.
Id. at 634 (emphasis in original).
25 One commentator has contrasted the effectiveness of strict scrutiny with the traditional rational relationship standard by characterizing the compelling interest standard as
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact" while the traditional equal protection was "minimal
scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact." Gunther, supra note 20, at 8 (footnote
omitted).
26 In Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972), the Court stated:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But
the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic
ill.
Thus, the Court rejected the appellant's contention that the right to decent housing was
fundamental, and that any encroachment upon that right should be reviewed by the
compelling state interest standard. Id. at 73-74.
Justice Douglas, however, in a dissenting opinion, recognized "[tihe home-whether
rented or owned-[as] the very heart of privacy in modern America," and thereby urged the
application of the strict scrutiny approach. Id. at 81-82. See also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369, 381 (1967); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City,
424 F.2d 291, 295-96 (9th Cir. 1970).
A New Jersey court has also identified the necessity of providing housing. See Oakwood
at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 16, 283 A.2d 353, 356 (L. Div.
1971), cert. granted, 62 N.J. 185, 299 A.2d 720 (1972), on remand, 128 N.J. Super. 438, 320
A.2d 223 (L. Div. 1974). In the initial decision, the court noted that
it cannot be maintained that the Legislature in the Zoning Act has empowered
municipalities to defy the general welfare or to ignore housing needs, insofar as
such needs are embraced within the general welfare.
117 N.J. Super. at 16, 283 A.2d at 356. For a further discussion of the right to housing see
Michelman, The Advent of a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv.
LIB. L. REv. 207 (1970).
21 Judicial reluctance to declare wealth a suspect classification is exemplified by San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-19, 28-29 (1973), in which
the Supreme Court upheld local school financing. But see Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,
487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d
187, supplemented, 119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (L. Div. 1972), affd as modified, 62 N.J.
473, 303 A.2d 273, supplemented, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
There is growing recognition in state courts, however, that zoning ordinances which
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quently, for the strict scrutiny standard to be an effective approach
in reviewing zoning legislation other than that which affects a
suspect classification, the legislation in question must abridge such
a fundamental freedom as access, movement and settlement into a
community or region. These incidents of the right to travel have
come to be viewed as basic to the exercise of our constitutional
freedoms.
Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the Articles of Confederation provided that "the people of each State shall have free
ingress and regress to and from any other State. '28 Despite the
omission of an express reference to the right to travel in the
Constitution, it has been assumed that the Framers considered the
concept of travel so fundamental that articulation was unnecessary.29 Although the right to travel has been accorded a
protected status by the courts, a divergence of opinion exists as to
the source of the right. Various rationales have been offered, such
as the privileges and immunities clauses of article IV, section 2 and
the fourteenth amendment, the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, 3 0the commerce clause, and the general
body of the Constitution.
The first acknowledgement of the right to travel by the Supreme Court appears in Chief Justice Taney's dissenting opinion in
the Passenger Cases. 3 1 The majority confined itself to declaring a
state tax on aliens arriving at local ports unconstitutional as violative of the commerce clause which vested such taxing power solely
in the federal government. 32 Chief Justice Taney, however, recognized the inherent authority of the state to tax aliens, but noted
that such taxing power could not be extended to embrace American citizens traveling interstate. For such citizens, the freedom of
discriminate based on wealth should be given closer judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Ybarra v.
Town of Los Altos Hills, 370 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 119 N.J. Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (L. Div.), cert.
granted, 62 N.J. 190, 299 A.2d 724 (1972); Molino v. Mayor & Council, 116 N.J. Super.
195, 281 A.2d 401 (L. Div. 1971). See also Freilich & Bass, Exclusionary Zoning: Suggested
LitigationApproaches, 3 URB. LAw. 344, 357-60 (1971); Sager, supra note 17, at 798-800; Note,
supra note 17, 84 HARV. L. REv. at 1657-62; Note, Snob Zoning: Must a Man's Home Be a
Castle?, 69 MIcH. L. REV. 339 (1970).
2

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. 4, § 1.

29

See Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 185 (1956).

30 Comment, The Right to Travel and Its Application to Restrictive Housing Laws, 66 Nw.
U.L. REv. 635, 638-39 (1972). For a discussion of the rationales upon which the right to
travel has been predicated see Comment, The Right to Travel--its Protection and Application
Under the Constitution, 40 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 66 (1971).
"' 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 464 (1849).
32 Id.
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movement was deemed to be an incident of national citizenship.3 3
As articulated in the oft-quoted passage:
For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was
formed, we are one people, with one common country. We -are
all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same
community, must have the right to pass and repass through
every 3part,
of it without interruption, as freely as in our own
4
States.

The views espoused by Chief Justice Taney were first accepted
by a majority of the Court in Crandall v. Nevada,3 5 in which a tax
levied by Nevada on citizens leaving the state was invalidated. The
Court arrived at its decision by considering the adverse effect such
a tax would have on an individual's access to the seat of govern3 6
ment in order to petition for redress of grievances.
More recently, the Court has premised the right to travel on
the commerce clause. In Edwards v. California,3 7 the state prohibited non-resident indigents from traveling into the state, thereby
severely curtailing individual freedom of movement. The statute
was invalidated by the Court as an impermissible burden upon
interstate commerce. 38 Although the commerce clause appears to
be a solid source upon which to predicate the right to travel, it
gives rise to a serious restriction. Because Congress has plenary
power over interstate commerce, an individual's freedom of
movement interstate could be subject to extensive federal
regulation. 3 9 Consequently, one's right to travel would not be accorded unlimited protection.
The scope of the right to travel was extended to include
foreign travel in the passport cases, Kent v. Dulles4" and Aptheker v.
33 Id. at 492.
31 Id. Consonant with Chief Justice Taney's view that the right to travel emanates from

the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, are the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 75-79 (1872), and Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870).
'5 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
36 Id. at 43-45, 48-49. The right to travel has also been predicated upon the privileges
and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, despite the Supreme Court's restrictive view of national citizenship as provided by the fourteenth amendment, enunciated in
the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1872). See Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160, 177-83 (1941) (Douglas & Jackson, JJ., concurring); Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78, 97 (1908).
37 314 U.S. 160 (1941).

38Id. at 174.
39 Comment, supra note 30, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. at 638-39 n.16.
40 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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Secretary of State. 41 Both cases involved the authority delegated to
the Secretary of State to issue and approve passports. In Kent, the
Secretary's denial of passports due to the applicant's Communist
Party affiliations was found to be an abuse of discretion. Although
the Court focused its decision on the scope of statutory authority
vested in the Secretary of State, it did recognize that freedom of
travel emanates from the liberty clause of the fifth amendment.42
The Court reiterated this rationale in Aptheker, in which a
federal statute which denied passports to persons with Communist
Party associations was invalidated. 43 Such restrictions, the Court
held, abridged the basic right of travel guaranteed by the liberty
clause of the fifth amendment. 44 More significantly, however, the
Court suggested that "freedom of travel is a constitutional liberty
closely related to rights of free speech and association," and thus
45
should be afforded the same degree of protection.
Additional strength was accorded the right to travel in United
States v. Guest,46 in which the Court prohibited private interference
with one's freedom of movement. Six defendants were charged
with conspiring to deprive Negro citizens of their constitutional
rights including the right to travel, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section
241. 47 The intent of this Act was to provide all citizens the opportunity to engage in the free exercise and enjoyment of all rights
secured by the Constitution. 48 In applying this statute, the Court
41 378 U.S. 500 (1964). For a discussion of the right to travel as it relates to the issuance
of passports see Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 47 (1956).
42 357 U.S. at 125. In recognizing the right to travel as originating in the fifth amend-

ment, the Court stated:
The right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen cannot be
deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.... Freedom of
movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well, was a
paft of our heritage. Travel abroad, like travel within the country, may be necessary
for a livelihood. It may be as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of
what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of
values.
Id. at 125-26 (footnote omitted).
13 378 U.S. at 501-02, 517. Compare id. with Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (Court
upheld Secretary of State's denial of a passport for travel to Cuba).
4 378 U.S. at 505.
11 Id. at 517. In a concurring opinion, Justices Black and Douglas remarked that travel
is a fundamental liberty akin to the rights of speech, assembly and association, implying that
the same heavy burden of proof required when first amendment freedoms are abridged
should be accorded to travel. Id. at 518-20. Accord, Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 26 (1965)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Kent and Aptheker see Comment, supra note 30,
66 Nw. U.L. REv. at 640-42.
.6 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
47 Id. at 746-47, 757.
48 Id. at 747.

NOTES

1974]

recognized that the right to travel is a fundamental right inherent
in the Constitution and is thereby protected from abridgement by
private action. 49 The Court concluded that "the constitutional right

of interstate travel is a right secured against interference from any
source whatever, whether governmental or private." 50 Thus, after
Guest, federal, state and private action interfering with travel was
prohibited.
Although Guest recognized that the right to travel "occupies a
position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union,' '5 1 it

was not until Shapiro v. Thompson5 2 that the Court articulated the
appropriate judicial standard of review when an abridgement of
this right occurs.5 3 In Shapiro, the Court evaluated an equal protection attack on the constitutionality of one year residency require54
ments which were necessary to qualify for state welfare benefits.
Recognizing the chilling effect the residency requirements had on
an indigent's exercise of his fundamental right to travel, 55 the
Court invoked the compelling state interest standard to assess the
statutes' validity. The Court explicitly acknowledged that "any
classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that [fundamental] right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.

' 56

Thus, the Court

invalidated the residency requirements as violative of the equal
57
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Recently, the vitality of Shapiro was illustrated in Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County.5 8 In Maricopa, the Court assessed the

validity of an Arizona statute requiring a one year residency within
a particular county in order to qualify for hospitalization at the
county's expense.5

9

The Court applied the compelling state interest

"' Id. at 759-60 & n.17. The Court deviated from the approach taken by prior courts by
not predicating the right to travel upon a particular source. Id. at 759.
10 Id. at 759-60 n.17.
1' Id. at 757.
52 394 U.S. 618 (1969). For an astute analysis of Shapiro see Note, Shapiro v. Thompson:
Travel, Welfare, and the Constitution, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 989 (1969).
11 394 U.S. at 638.
54 Id. at 623-25.
51 Id. at 631. The Court stated:
An indigent who desires to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a new life will
doubtless hesitate if he knows that he must risk making the move without the
possibility of falling back on state welfare assistance.
Id. at 629.
51Id. at 634 (emphasis in original).
51Id. at 638.
58 94 S. Ct. 1076 (1974).
59Id. at 1079. See also Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807, 810-13 (1st Cir. 1970),
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standard enunciated in Shapiro to the classification which affected
interstate travel 60 and thereby reasserted that strict scrutiny was the
proper means of judicial review when an abridgement of travel
61

occurs.

It was not until Petaluma, however, that the right to travel was
used as the basis to directly invalidate a no growth zoning
ordinance.6 2 In deciding Petaluma,Judge Burke relied heavily on a
number of cases recently adjudicated -by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, in which the court impliedly recognized that exclusionary zoning ordinances encroach on the right of free
63
mobility.
In National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn, 6 4 for instance, the
court addressed itself to the sole issue of the constitutionality of an
Easttown zoning ordinance requiring four acre minimum building
lots. Like Petaluma, the Township of Easttown was situated in the
path of rapid population expansion and was desirous of preserving
the character of the community. The court, however, held that the
ordinance unreasonably restricted the use of private property and
65
was therefore an invalid exercise of the city's police power.
In arriving at its conclusion, the court offered the following
cogent analysis of the valid objectives of zoning legislation:
Zoning is a tool in the hands of governmental bodies which
enables them to more effectively meet the demands of evolving
and growing communities. It must not and can not be used by
those officials as an instrument by which they may shirk their
responsibilities. Zoning is a means by which a governmental body
in which the court determined a residency requirement to qualify for low income housing to
be an encroachment upon one's freedom of movement and right to settle. But see Lane v.
McGarry, 320 F. Supp. 562 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (residency requirement for ,public housing
upheld).
60 94 S. Ct. at 1080. Courts have also indicated that the right to travel includes intrastate
movement. See, e.g., King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d
Cir. 1971), in which the court stated:
It would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state.
Id. at 648 (footnote omitted). See also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 255 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part); Comment, Intrastate Residence Requirements for Welfare
and the Rights to Intrastate Travel 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 591, 600-12 (1973).
61 94 S. Ct. at 1082. Maricopa also recognized that standing should not be dependent
upon a showing of actual deterrence. Id.
62 375 F. Supp. at 581.
63 Id. at 584.
64

419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).

65 Id. at 511-12, 215 A.2d at 602. In invalidating the legislation, the court indicated that

in order to sustain an ordinance under the police powers of the municipality, the ordinance
had to benefit the community, not private interests or desires. Id. at 530-31, 215 A.2d at 611.
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can plan for the future-it may not be used as a means to deny
the future ....

Zoning provisions may not be used .

.

. to avoid

the increased responsibilities and economic
burdens which time
66
and natural growth invariably bring.
The court further maintained that an ordinance enacted primarily
"to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid future
burdens, economic and otherwise" is constitutionally impermissible.6 7 Thus, the significance of National Land rests in the
court's implicit recognition of the effect that such zoning restrictions have on the right to travel.
In an analogous decision, Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc.,6 s the
court overturned a municipal zoning ordinance requiring two and
three acre minimum lots. Relying on the rationale expressed in
National Land, the court indicated its unwillingness to uphold any
ordinance specifically designed to exclude people from settling
within its boundaries. 69 Although the township reasoned that the
ordinance was necessitated by inadequate sewerage facilities, the
court rejected this justification. 70 Rather, the court maintained that
a community must provide whatever essential municipal services
are required to meet future population growth. 71 Consequently,
Kit-Mar established that a municipality may no longer be oblivious
to the needs of a growing society.
A third Pennsylvania case, Appeal of Girsh,72 enunciated the
view that a community may not enact ordinances for the sole
purpose of frustrating the natural growth pattern of the community. In that case, the court invalidated a zoning ordinance which
contained no provision for apartments. The court perceived the
township's plan as an effective scheme "to zone out" future
residents 73 and an attempt "to 'stand in the way of the natural
66 Id. at 527-28, 215 A.2d at 610 (footnotes omitted).

67 Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612. The court, however, does not preclude a community
from using its zoning power to provide municipal services in an orderly and rational
manner. Id.
68 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
69 Id. at 474-75, 268 A.2d at 768-69.
10 Id. at 476-78, 268 A.2d at 769-70.
7 Id. at 474-76, 268 A.2d at 768-69. In recognizing the need to accommodate new
residents the court stated:
The implication of our decision in National Land is that communities must deal
with the problems of population growth. They may not refuse to confront the
future by adopting zoning regulations that effectively restrict population to near
present levels.
Id. at 474, 268 A.2d at 768 (footnote omitted).
72 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
73 Id. at 242, 263 A.2d at 397 (emphasis in original).
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forces which send our growing population into hitherto undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable place to live.' -74 Such a
ban on apartments, the court noted, inhibits the movement of
persons intending to settle within a particular region or
75
community.
The view that a community may not impede natural population growth is consonant with the view of the First Circuit in Steel
Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton. 7' Although the court
upheld a zoning ordinance amendment which increased minimum
lot size from 35,000 sq. ft. to 3 and 6 acres,7 7 the court emphasized
the distinctions between Sanbornton, an isolated rural community,
and those towns situated in the path of suburban growth. 78 In
indicating that it may well have arrived at a different conclusion
had the ordinance restricted natural population growth, the court
offered persuasive dictum:
Where there is natural population growth it has to go somewhere, unwelcome as it may be, and in that case we do not think
it should be channelled by the happenstance of what town gets its
veto in first.79

Furthermore, the court stressed that it approved the amendment
only as a stop-gap measure to enable the village to prepare a
comprehensive plan for future growth. Clearly, any permanent
population restrictions would be invalidated as an unacceptable
basis upon which to formulate land use policy."'
Adopting the underlying philosophy of the Pennsylvania cases,
the court in Petaluma invalidated local zoning ordinances which
sought to restrict natural population growth as an abridgement of
the right to travel. In framing the issue confronting the court,
Judge Burke stated:
[M]ay a municipality capable of supporting a natural population
expansion limit growth simply because it does not prefer to grow
at the rate
which would be dictated by prevailing market
8
demand.

1

74 Id. at 244, 263 A.2d at 398 (quoting from National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa.
504, 532, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965)).
75 437 Pa. at 243-46, 263 A.2d at 398-99.
76 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972).
77 Id. at 958-59, 963. The ordinance was enacted to maintain the town's rural character
which was threatened by a proposed development of 500 vacation homes. Id. at 958.
78 Id. at 960-61.
19 Id. at 962.
80

Id.

81 375 F. Supp. at 583.
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In holding that a community may not so limit the natural growth
of a region, the court accepted the view advanced by the plaintiffs
that the Petaluma Plan was unduly restrictive of one's freedom of
mobility. s2 The court further stated that the determination of
where one should live is not within the decision making power of a
municipality, but rather within the province of an individual's
s3
personal choice.
Because the court held that the challenged ordinances encroached upon the fundamental right to travel, the court invoked
the strict scrutiny analysis to assess the constitutionality of the
legislation.8 4 Under this approach, the defendants were required to
set forth compelling state interests in order to justify the Plan.
The city contended that the Petaluma Plan was promulgated
upon proper municipal zoning authority and that the restrictions
were necessary in order to provide proper sewerage treatment
facilities, to maintain an adequate water supply and to preserve its
own rate of growth in order to protect its character.8 5 More
specifically, Petaluma argued that its sewerage treatment plants did
not have sufficient capacity at present to handle rapid population
growth.8 6 The court, however, not only found that adequate
facilities did exist, but also noted the city's ability to augment its
sewer capacity.87 Implicit in the court's finding is that a municipality must take affirmative action to maintain its infrastructure at
levels capable of satisfying market demands as well as to enlarge
facilities to meet future growth and development."8
Additionally, the City of Petaluma contended that a lack of
adequate water supply justified its growth controls.8 9 However, the
court found that the alleged shortage was due to the city's deliberate contracting for the amount necessary to sustain only the predetermined population.9"
82

Id. at 581.

93 Id.
84 Id. at 582.
85 Id. at 582-83.
16 Id. at 582.
87 Id. at 578, 582-83.
88 Id. at 583. The responsibility to provide for future community needs falls within the
discretion of city officials. As stated by the court:
Neither Petaluma city officials, nor the local electorate may use their power to
disapprove bonds at the polls as a weapon to define or destroy fundamental
constitutional rights.
Id. Consequently, municipal infrastructure may not be used as a population control technique.
89 Id. at 583.

90 Id. at 578, 583.
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Finally, the city's assertion that a community has the authority
to maintain its present character in disregard of future regional
needs was expressly rejected by the court. 9 1 This rationale, which is
the underlying premise of the no growth movement, is predicated
upon the traditional perception that general welfare is viewed in a
parochial context. In essence, this means that concern is centered
on the local community rather than the neighboring areas. 92
In denouncing the town's isolationist approach to planning,
the court in Petaluma abandoned the local perspective of general
welfare. Instead, the court advocated that the Petaluma Plan be
reviewed within a regional framework 93 based upon the
91 Id. at 583.

92 For a discussion of the effects of the local approach to zoning see Feiler, Metropolitanizationand Land-Use Parochialism-Towarda Judicial Attitude, 69 MICH. L. REv. 655,
656-60 (1971); Freilich & Bass, supra note 27, at 346-47, 367-70.
91 375 F. Supp. at 579. Although the regional approach to zoning has not gained
majority status, it has been recognized by a growing number of courts. Recently, a New
Jersey court mandated that a municipality approach zoning and planning through a regional
framework. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283
A.2d 353 (L. Div. 1971), cert. granted, 62 N.J. 185, 299 A.2d 720 (1972), on remand, 128 N.J.
Super. 438, 320 A.2d 223 (L. Div. 1974). The court there stated:
In pursuing the valid zoning purpose of a balanced community, a municipality
must not ignore housing needs, that is, its fair proportion of the obligation to meet
the housing needs of its own population and of the region.... The general welfare
does not stop at each municipal boundary.
117 N.J. Super. at 20, 283 A.2d at 358.
The view adopted in Oakwood at Madison is consonant with that enunciated earlier by
Justice Hall in his now famous dissent in Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d
129 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963). In taking issue with the majority's decision
upholding the exclusion of mobile homes, Justice Hall declared:
The import of the holding gives almost boundless freedom to developing
municipalities to erect exclusionary walls on their boundaries, according to local
whim or selfiish desire, and to use the zoning power for aims beyond its legitimate
purposes.
37 N.J. at 252-53, 181 A.2d at 140. See also Green v. Lima Township, 40 Mich. App. 655,
199 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1972) (exclusion of mobile park had to promote general welfare
of region as well as of local community).
The Pennsylvania supreme court has also recognized the importance of regional considerations. See, e.g., Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 474-75, 268 A.2d 765,
768-69 (1970); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 245 n.4, 263 A.2d 395, 399 (1970); National
Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 528, 215 A.2d 597, 610 (1965).
The Court of Appeals of New York has acknowledged the interrelationship between
municipal and regional planning. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 376, 285 N.E.2d
291, 300, 334 N.Y.S2d 138, 150, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). Nevertheless, the
court upheld a local approach, inasmuch as the power to zone was vested in the local
municipality. However, in a vigorous dissent, Judge Breitel advocated a regional approach,
stating:
Generally, there is the view that the conflict requires solution at a regional or State
level, usually with local administration, and not by compounding the conflict with
idiosyncratic municipal action ....
30 N.Y.2d at 385, 285 N.E.2d at 306, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 158 (citations omitted).
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legislation's cumulative impact within the region. 94 Furthermore,
the court stressed the importance of measuring "the potential effects that the exclusion practiced by Petaluma would have if it
proliferated throughout the region itself." 95 Thus, the court advanced the theory that regional development provides the most
effective means to manage future growth. 96
In rejecting each of the defendants' contentions as untenable,
the court provided insight into what criteria will not satisfy the
compelling interest standard. 97 The court maintained that any ordinance, the purpose or direct effect of which is to exclude "additional residents in any degree is not a compelling governmental
interest, nor is it one within the public welfare.19 8 Despite this
strong language of the court, the decision does not preclude the
ability of a community to satisfy the strict scrutiny review. The
court does suggest that a municipality must attempt in good faith
to provide proper facilities to anticipate growth. Presumably, a
community that can demonstrate such good faith, but does not
have adequate natural or capital resources to meet present or
future demand could satisfy the compelling interest burden.
The necessity of good faith was emphasized in the landmark
case of Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo,99 in which the
9" 375 F. Supp. at 579. The cumulative impact test was articulated in Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), in which the Court upheld the right of the Secretary of
Agriculture to control the marketing of wheat by assigning quotas to individual farmers. In
evaluating the plaintiffs contention, the Court stated:
That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is
not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his
contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial.
Id. at 127-28.
95 375 F. Supp. at 579. In analyzing the effect that proliferation of the Petaluma Plan
would have on the region, the court concluded that it would result in
a decline in regional housing stock quality, a loss of the mobility of current and
prospective residents and a deterioration in the quality and choice of housing
available to income earners with real incomes of $14,000 per year or less.
Id. at 581.
96 Id. at 579-81. Commentators are also beginning to urge that regional development be
adopted. See, e.g., Comment, Exclusionary Use of Planned Unit Development: Standards for
Judicial Scrutiny, 8 HARV. Civ. RPGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 384, 399-404 (1973); Comment,
Exclusionary Zoning: A Legislative Approach, 22 SYRAcuSE L. REV. 583, 585-90 (1971); Note,
Regional Impact of Zoning: A Suggested Approach, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (1966).
91 375 F. Supp. at 583, where the court declared:
Where a municipality purposefully limits the quantity of any particular commodity available, then seeks to justify a population limitation based upon an alleged
inadequacy of that commodity, it has not stated a compelling interest which supports the limitation.
98 Id. at 586.
99 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 207

New York court of appeals upheld a phased time growth plan. The
town had amended its zoning ordinance to allow residential development only in conjunction with the availability of adequate
municipal facilities. This plan was to be in effect for the
municipality's eighteen year capital improvement period.' 0 0 The
court upheld the plan, but recognized the exclusionary effect of
phased time growth when not properly implemented in good
faith.1 0 1
Although the court did not explicitly address the issue of the
ordinance's effect on the right to travel, it was cognizant of the
potential effect such legislation has on one's exercise of this fundamental right. In dictum, the court suggested that any zoning
plan which affected the freedom of movement was "inherently
suspect" until such time as a municipality could meet increased
demands.1 0 2 In a strong dissent, Judge Breitel categorically denounced as unconstitutional any zoning plan which affects the
freedom of movement.

10 3

Although the concept of phased time growth gained judicial
acceptance in Ramapo, Petaluma seems to place the future vitality of
this approach in jeopardy. 10 4 Whether phased time growth is implemented on a local level or regional scale, it has the possible
effect of fostering restrictive population growth policies as well as
burdening freedom of movement. Until future courts adjudicate
the question, the constitutionality of phased time growth will remain unsettled.
The Petaluma decision does not, however, abrogate traditional
(1972). For an extended discussion of Ramapo see Note, A Zoning Programfor Phased Growth:
Ramapo Township's Time Controls on Residential Development, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 723 (1972).
100 30 N.Y.2d at 367, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143. The zoning ordinance
was challenged as an unconstitutional taking of property by a governmental body. Id. at 366,
381, 285 N.E.2d at 294, 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142, 155.
101 Id. at 382, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155. Commenting on the need for
good faith on the part of the municipality in carrying out its capital improvement plan, the
court stated:
[W]e must assume the Town will put its best effort forward in implementing the
physical and fiscal timetable outlined under the plan. Should subsequent events
prove this assumption unwarranted, or, should the Town because of some unforeseen event fail in its primary obligation to these landowners, there will be ample
opportunity to undo the restrictions upon default.
Id.
102 Id. at 375, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
103 Id. at 391, 285 N.E.2d at 310, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 163, where Chief Judge Breitel
stated:
They [townships] may not declare moratoria on growth and development for as
much as a generation. They may not separately or in concert impair the freedom of
movement or residence of those outside their borders, even by ingenious schemes.
104 For a critical view of the phased time growth plan see Bosselman, supra note 17, at
242-52.
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0 6
zoning techniques, 10 5 such as minimum lot requirements,1
10 7
restrictions on multiple
minimum floor space requirements,
9 subdivision controls,'' 0 age
0
08
and mobile homes,'
dwellings'
limitations,"' and moratoria."1 2 Thus, local governments may con-

105 375 F. Supp. at 587. The court stated that its holding 'was
intended to encompass, not only the outright numerical limitations upon the issuance of building permits, but also any and all features of the plan which, directly
or indirectly, seek to control population growth by any means other than market
demands.
Id. at 586. For a comprehensive discussion of growth control techniques see Cutler, Legal and
Illegal Methods for Controlling Community Growth on the Urban Fringe, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 370;
Freilich, Development Timing, Moratoria, and Controlling Growth, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL
FOUNDATION, INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 147 (1974).
IS' See cases listed in notes 17 & 19 supra.
107 Ordinances regulating minimum floor space have been sustained by courts. See, e.g.,

Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165,-89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal
dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953). For a further discussion of this case see Haar, Wayne Township:
Zoningfor Whom?-In Brief Reply, 67 HARV. L. REV. 986 (1954); Haar, Zoning for Minimum
Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1051 (1953).
108 The issue of municipal limitations on multiple dwellings has been frequently adjudicated. See, e.g., Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925) (exclusion of
apartments upheld); Zelvin v. Zoning Bd., 30 Conn. Supp. 157, 306 A.2d 151 (Hartford
County C.P. 1973) (ordinance from which apartment provision had been deleted upheld);
Malmar Associates v. Board of County Comm'rs, 260 Md. 292, 272 A.2d 6 (1971) (maximum
number of bedroom limitations valid); Molino v. Mayor and Council, 116 N.J. Super. 195,
281 A.2d 401 (L. Div. 1971) (bedroom restrictions invalid); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237,
263 A.2d 395 (1970) (ordinance containing no provisions for apartments invalid). For a
comprehensive discussion of apartment limitations see Williams & Norman, Exclusionary
Land Use Controls: The Case of North-Eastern New Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 475, 481-88
(1971).
"I Municipalities have taken the attitude that mobile homes will decrease property
values and cause harm to the general welfare. See Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232,
181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963) (upheld exclusion of mobile homes).
Contra, Town of Gloucester v. Olivo's Mobile Home Court, Inc., 300 A.2d 465 (R.I. 1973)
(invalidated ordinance limiting mobile homes).
110 Developers are often required to dedicate land for municipal purposes in order to
receive subdivision approval. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4
Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971) (ordinance
requiring dedication of land for recreational purposes or cash payments in lieu of dedication
sustained); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d
955 (1966) (ordinance requiring developer to pay fee in lieu of dedication for recreational
land before subdivision approval valid). But see Admiral Dev. Corp. v. City of Maitland, 267
So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (ordinance requiring 5% of the gross area of land to be
developed dedicated to city for recreational purposes held invalid); Longridge Builders, Inc.
v. Planning Bd., 98 N.J. Super. 67, 236 A.2d 154 (App. Div. 1967) (municipality cannot
force developer to pave off-site roads); Leisure Technology Northeast, Inc. v. Township of
Dover, No. L-8236-73 (N.J. Super. Ct., L. Div., Feb. 27, 1974) (forced land dedications held
unconstitutional).
.. Adult communities or senior citizen developments generally require that residents
be a minimum age. However, New Jersey courts have declared age zoning invalid. See, e.g.,
Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 125 N.J. Super. 376, 311 A.2d 187 (App. Div.
1973), cert. granted, 65 N.J. 570, 325 A.2d 704 (1974); Shepard v. Woodland Township
Comm., 128 N.J. Super. 379, 320 A.2d 191 (Ch. 1974).
112 See, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Assoc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.
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tinue to implement zoning ordinances providing that restrictions on
population growth do not interfere with the market demands of
l1 3
the region.
Although Petaluma makes it clear that no municipality,
through whatever means, may deny an individual the freedom of
iiobility and the choice to settle wherever he pleases, the decision
raises a number of complex issues. One issue left for determination
by future courts is whether the Petaluma approach should be applicable to municipalities other than regional growth centers, and
whether a regional perspective of planning should replace the
traditional concept of local home rule. However, the most critical
question demanding resolution is whether a community ever possesses the authority to intentionally limit its population and growth.
The Petaluma court sought to resolve this issue by invoking a strict
scrutiny analysis of Petaluma's zoning ordinances, although the
question of what criteria will satisfy the compelling state interest
standard still remains unanswered.
Whether courts adopt the approach advocated by Petaluma and
review exclusionary zoning ordinances as an encroachment upon
one's fundamental right to travel or whether the Supreme Court
reevaluates its position and declares the right to housing fundamental, it is incumbent upon the judiciary to review all exclusionary zoning ordinances by a strict scrutiny standard. Until the courts
adopt such an approach, they will be unable to provide the necessary guidelines for determining the proper balance between the
power of a municipality to restrict its growth and the constitutional
rights of an expanding population.
Daniel R. Siegel
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (moratorium designed to prevent construction of
low-income housing invalid); New Jersey Shore Builders Ass'n v. Township of Ocean, 128
N.J. Super. 135, 319 A.2d 255 (App. Div. 1974) (moratorium in order to amend zoning
ordinances valid). For an in-depth discussion of the ramifications of moratoria see Rivkin,
Growth Control via Sewer Moratoria, 33 URB.- LAND 10 (March, 1974).
113 375 F. Supp. at 586-87. Presently, the constitutionality of a city
ordinance establishing a numerical limit on housing units below market demand is under challenge in Boca
Raton, Florida. Boulder, Colorado also considered instituting population growth limitations.
Although the citizens did not pass a resolution to limit the population to 100,000 residents,
the City Council has advised that an alternate program to restrict growth be prepared.
Freilich, supra note 105, at 197-99. See also Note, Municipal Government Attempts to Curtail
Growth May Violate Right to Travel, 60 GEo. L.J. 1363 (1972).

